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social movements make demands opposing racial and 
gender discrimination, the socially disastrous effects 
of austerity policies, the ecologically dangerous, 
unrestricted exploitation of nature, and centralized, 
anti-democratic control over technological progress. 
According to Feenberg, the Lukácsian notion of 
mediation can help us understand these movements 
as a moment in the dialectics of reification and de-
reification. Further on, resistance to reification may 
still be politically weak and scattered; however, it 
operates on the deeper level of changing the capitalist 
a priori of everyday experience, drawing upon the 
cultural resources of a ‘new sensibility’, informed by 
aesthetic experience, as Marcuse would like to have it. 
The contribution of Feenberg’s new book is its critical 
reappropriation of an important theoretical tradition 
of modernity, showing cogently that it possesses the 
theoretical potential to conceptually articulate the 
new cultural consciousness gradually formed by the 
new social movements, and to delineate a positive 
emancipative perspective of present struggles. It can 
thus give rise to fruitful dialogue on the necessary re-
radicalization of social critique in the face of the deep 
and multifaceted crisis of contemporary capitalism.
Konstantinos Kavoulakos 
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The twelve chapters in this volume consider the place 
of Hegel within Marx’s critique of political economy, 
specifically the place of the Science of Logic within the 
various drafts of Capital. Collectively, they constitute 
a referendum on what in the Marxian literature has 
come to be variously labelled as the ‘New Hegelian 
Marxism’, the ‘New Dialectics’ and ‘Systematic Dia-
lectics’. Whilst this reading of Marx (which has been 
around for over two decades now and whose status as 
‘new’ would thus seem to be waning) takes in a wide 
variety of accounts of the Hegel–Marx confrontation, 
it is unified to the extent that it specifically empha-
sizes the influence of the ‘late’ Hegel on the ‘late’ 
Marx. In other words, it is not Marx’s early, explicit 
critiques of Hegel in the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, the Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and 
Philosophy in General, and so on, but his implicit 
appropriation of the Logic within Capital that defines 
the systematicity of his work. 
Some proponents of the New Dialectics stress 
the ways in which the Logic provides not only a 
methodological but an ontological model for Marx’s 
‘exposition’ (Darstellung) of capital as self-valorizing 
value. This dovetails with the so-called ‘homology 
thesis’; namely, the three Doctrines of the Logic 
(Being, Essence and Concept) are homologous to 
the systematic development of the value-form in 
Capital, from the commodity to money to capital. The 
work of Chris Arthur, included in this volume, is an 
emblematic example of this standpoint. (For a more 
extensive treatment, see Arthur’s The New Dialectic 
and Marx’s Capital, reviewed by John Kraniauskas in 
RP 122.) Others associated with the New Dialectics 
take a more cautious approach, underscoring what 
they see as Marx’s highly selective and changing use 
of the Logic, whilst still others contend that the intel-
ligibility of Marx’s dialectic must ultimately be based 
in his rejection of the inescapably idealist character of 
Hegel’s dialectic. The critical function of this volume 
is attributable to this diversity of positions. There is 
a palpable tension between the chapters, but this is 
precisely what makes it a contribution to our under-
standing of Hegel and Marx. 
The axes around which the debates turn are famil-
iar. The well-trodden ‘opposition’ between Marx’s 
materialism and Hegel’s idealism, including Marx’s 
declared ‘inversion’ (Umstülpen) of the Hegelian 
dialectic, consistently surfaces in the chapters. For 
Tony Smith, this is a false opposition, rendering the 
metaphor of inversion both misplaced and mislead-
ing. Quoting Marx against his own reading of Hegel, 
Smith suggests that ‘“absolute thought” refers … to 
anyone’s thinking in so far as it “cognize[s] the imma-
nent soul of [the] material and … concede[s] to it its 
right to its own proper life”.’ In this sense, Marx’s 
‘systematic reconstruction in thought of the essential 
determinations of capitalism’ should be viewed as 
exemplary of the Absolute Idea: it is wholly account-
able to the objective content of the world. This mate-
rialist Hegel also features in Mark Meaney’s and 
Roberto Fineschi’s analyses of, respectively, interest-
bearing capital and capital in general, both of which 
insist that Hegel’s dialectic is completely internal 
to the self-development of the determined content 
it articulates. On the other hand, the chapters by 
Juan Iñigo Carrera, and Gastón Caligaris and Guido 
Starosta, toe the orthodox Marxist line that Hegel’s 
dialectic is in fact inverted. For Caligaris and Starosta, 
the Logic is ‘inherently flawed’ because its systematic 
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dialectic ‘begins with the simplest thought-form (that 
is, with a purely ideal or formal abstraction)’, and, con-
sequently, it cannot register the inner movement of 
‘real material being’. Similarly, Carrera claims that 
Marx begins Capital by ‘confronting the commod-
ity as a real concrete and not as a category or a 
concept’. The pro-inversion camp is not strengthened 
(although it is perhaps well represented) by these two 
chapters. Both operate with a rigid dualism between 
‘ideal’, ‘abstract’, ‘thought’, ‘concept’, ‘category’, and so 
forth, on the one hand, and ‘material’, ‘concrete’, ‘the 
real’, and so forth, on the other. Such dualism does 
not just impoverish the dialectical interplay between 
these categories in Hegel and Marx, but conflates the 
meaning of different categories within each opposing 
side. An upshot of this (a problem, to be fair, which 
the materialist Hegel camp in this volume also fails to 
address) is that, whether intentionally or not, ‘matter’, 
not ‘sensuous human activity’ or ‘labour’, becomes 
the implicit ground of Marx’s concept of materialism.
The relationship between Hegel’s ‘Concept’ and 
Marx’s ‘capital’ takes centre stage in many of the 
chapters by the economists. The crux of the matter 
here is whether the moments of the Concept (uni-
versality, particularity and singularity) correspond 
to those of capital in general, many competing capi-
tals and interest-bearing/finance capital in Capital. 
Meaney, Fineschi and Fred Moseley each stress dif-
ferent dimensions of this homology, but all agree 
that this structure is in place. (This is not true of all 
the contributors. For instance, Smith insinuates that 
Hegel’s ‘singularity’ potentially corresponds to Marx’s 
‘social individual’ in communism, but certainly not 
to bank capital.) These chapters meticulously chart 
the changing course of this homology through the 
ten years of drafts of Capital, but what they offer 
in close textual and philological exegesis does not 
make up for the fact that there is actually very little 
critical engagement with the Logic or with Capital in 
themselves, relegating the Hegel–Marx confrontation 
to a simple framework of one-to-one mapping. The 
critical power of interpreting capital as a manifesta-
tion of the Hegelian Concept is subsequently limited.
Matters are more complex – and much more prom-
ising – with those chapters that integrate the Logic’s 
Doctrine of Essence, which is to say the essence/
appearance (Wesen/Erscheinung) relation, into their 
analyses of Capital. There is no consensus on the 
precise contours of Marx’s use of the Essence-Logic, 
but each reading adheres to what Patrick Murray calls 
a ‘disruptive overlap’ between the Essence-Logic and 
the Concept-Logic. Smith declares that Marx grasps 
the structure of capital – qua self-valorizing value – as 
‘precisely isomorphic with the structure of Hegel’s Abso-
lute’, but ultimately the most consequential (Hegelian) 
aspect of Capital is that ‘the social ontology of general-
ized commodity-production is defined by two completely 
incommensurable Essence-Logics in Hegel’s sense of the 
term.’ This is the conflict between money as the 
adequate form of appearance of value, and money 
as the fetishized form of appearance of the social, 
such that value is ‘the reified and alien form sociality 
takes when it is in the historically specific mode 
of dissociated sociality’. This foundational contra-
diction (never overcome in capitalism) constitutes 
for Smith the meaning of Marx’s critical systematic 
dialectic, as against Hegel’s affirmative systematic dia-
lectic. For his part, Riccardo Bellofiore prioritizes the 
semblance–appearance (Schein–Erscheinung) distinc-
tion, not the universality–particularity–singularity 
structure, as the crucial homology between the Logic 
and Capital. He then – quite convincingly – extends 
this distinction to that between ‘fetishism’ (Schein) 
and the ‘fetish-character of capital’ (Erscheinung). 
Bellofiore’s and Smith’s accounts are both enriched 
by Igor Hanzel’s close reconstruction of the circular 
movement from Schein to ground (Grund, the central 
category of Wesen) to Erscheinung in Capital. 
Not coincidentally, these are the same chapters 
that weigh in on the relevance of Hegel’s concept 
of subject to Marx’s concept of capital. With the 
exception of Bellofiore (and Arthur elsewhere), the 
standpoint of this volume is that the ‘self-moving sub-
stance’ – the substance-subject – does not, as Hanzel 
puts it, ‘contribute to Marx’s conceptual grasping of 
the very real ground of the social relation charac-
terized by … “capital”’. The hang-up, in a nutshell, 
is the production process. For Smith, because the 
Doctrine of the Concept lacks an adequate concept 
of capital, the substance-subject does not register 
‘how coercion, alienation and expropriation pervade 
modern society’. The outcome of Murray’s examina-
tion of surplus-value and profit is that Marx uses the 
Concept-Logic in order to explain capital’s pretence 
to be a self-valorizing subject and the Essence-Logic 
in order to expose this subjectivity as fraudulent. 
Keying into Marx’s well-known depiction of value 
as an ‘automatic’ and ‘dominant’ subject, Hanzel 
argues that the precise location of these passages – in 
Chapter IV of Capital Volume 1, and hence before 
Marx’s journey into the ‘hidden abode of produc-
tion’ – dictates that capital only masquerades as a 
Hegelian subject, that capital’s subjectivity can only 
be comprehended at the level of false appearance 
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(Schein), not real ground (a ‘historically specific social 
relation of production’).
It is possible to disagree with these conclusions – 
Bellofiore makes a compelling case that the ‘“linear” 
exploitation of workers and class-struggle in production’ 
does not preclude us from understanding capital as 
an instance of the Hegelian subject. However, the 
issue is not the conclusions themselves, but rather the 
framework through which they are read. We need to 
be wary of the premiss – which not every contributor 
in this volume necessarily holds to, but which not 
one single chapter critiques – that the systematicity 
of Hegel’s and Marx’s ‘systematic dialectic’ is defined 
by its separation from, and opposition to, a ‘historical 
dialectic’. This is a basic tenet of much of the litera-
ture in Systematic Dialectics: history and historical 
time must be excluded from the domain of the sys-
tematic. There are many problems with this. For one, 
it exempts the Logic from being held accountable to 
its own historicity. It also rejects the fact that history 
and historical time are immanent to the systematic 
development of the value-form in Capital, a fact that 
undercuts Hanzel’s claim that the passages on value 
as subject do not express the category ‘real ground’. 
These problems coincide with a constitutive tension 
at the heart of Systematic Dialectics: it is predicated 
on the historical specificity of capitalism, not to 
mention categories of the philosophy of history like 
‘the modern’ and ‘the contemporary’. There are a 
number of things to take away from this volume, but 
the false opposition between systematic and histori-
cal dialectics is not one of them. 
George Tomlinson
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It has been revealed recently that Chinese premier 
Zhou Enlai’s iconic 1972 statement ‘It is too soon to 
tell’ did not refer to the French Revolution of 1789, but 
to the May days of 1968. This is perhaps a sign of the 
times: a recent trend in historiography attempts to 
understand the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
on their own terms rather than through the prism 
of the twentieth century. Jonathan Sperber embodies 
this trend. In the same way that Blackbourn and Eley, 
in The Peculiarities of German History, do not depict 
the so-called ‘failed bourgeois revolutions’ of 1848 
as initiating the inexorable path to Hitler, neither 
does Sperber cast Marx under the shadow of Stalin. 
Nevertheless, Sperber’s disassociation of Marx from 
twentieth-century communism also comes at the 
cost of denying his relevance for twenty-first-century 
capitalism:
Putting Marx into that era means remembering 
that what Marx meant by ‘capitalism’ was not the 
contemporary version of it, that the bourgeoisie 
Marx critically dissected was not today’s class of 
global capitalists, that Marx’s understanding of 
science and scholarship, contained in the German 
word Wissenschaft, had connotations different from 
contemporary usage. 
Sperber is but one in a long line of commentators to 
assert this. Marx, it seems, is perennially irrelevant. 
Hegel once said that each individual is a child of their 
time. We can no more think beyond our historical 
period than jump over our own shadow. Yet, while 
Marx clearly has one foot in the nineteenth century, 
Sperber overemphasizes it to the detriment of that 
other foot which, leaping forward, has yet to come 
down.
Sperber contends that historical developments 
have superseded Marx. The world of service-sector 
work and joint-stock companies are ‘outside Marx’s 
intellectual universe’. This neglects Marx’s discus-
sions of these phenomena in, among other places, 
chapter 16 of Capital Volume I or chapter 23 of Capital 
Volume III. Contemporary Marxists like Ursula Huws 
have shown that Marx’s theory of the working class 
is no less applicable to contemporary service-sector 
workers than to industrial factory workers, or, like 
Guglielmo Carchedi, have shown that Marx’s concep-
tion of the capitalist class can be fruitfully applied to 
recent developments in the corporate firm. Sperber 
calls such updates ‘Marxology’ and deems them 
‘singularly useless pastimes’. He says little, however, 
about the extent to which the processes Marx identi-
fies as essential to capitalism – exploitation, class 
struggle and crisis – remain despite these historical 
developments. Sperber cites the standard criticisms 
of the ‘transformation problem’ and the theory of 
